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I.

INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifty years, the percentage of women in the

workforce has increased dramatically.1

As a result of this

change, more women become pregnant while in the workforce.2

Over

the past fifteen years, both the federal government and several
state governments have attempted to meet the needs of pregnant
employees by passing leave legislation, which requires employers
to offer a required amount of job-protected leave for women
during and after their pregnancies.3

However, despite these

efforts, significant gaps in the law remain that prevent
pregnant employees from receiving the comprehensive leave they

1

See BUREAU

OF

LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

IN THE

OF

LABOR, CHANGES

IN

WOMEN'S

20TH CENTURY (2000) (reporting that from

1950 to 1998 the participation rate of women in the workforce
increased from one in three to three in five).
2

See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN

ET AL.,

MATERNITY POLICIES

AND

WORKING WOMEN 5

(1983) (estimating that eighty-five percent of working women are
likely to become pregnant during their careers).
3

See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §

2612 (2005) (providing twelve weeks of leave for medical
reasons, including pregnancy); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300-3306
(2005) (providing residents of California with six weeks of paid
leave to care for a newborn or newly adopted child).
4

need.4
The source of this gap is the separation of the singular
condition of pregnancy into three distinct categories of
absence.5

The first category of absence covers illnesses

directly related to gestation, which can require leave from
work.6

4

The second category of absence covers the physical act of

See JODI GRANT

ET AL.,

EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS

OF

PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 9 (2005) (reporting that no state gives all
employees both job-protected leave and benefits).
5

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (separating pregnancy and

childbirth under its medical leave provision and allowing
parental leave for the birth of a child under the parental leave
provision).
6

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:341 (2005) (limiting leave

only to medical conditions associated with pregnancy and
childbirth and excluding parental leave).

See Am. Pregnancy

Ass’n, Pregnancy Symptoms – Early Signs of Pregnancy,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/gettingpregnant/
earlypregnancysymptoms.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005)
(listing some of the most common symptoms of pregnancy as
morning sickness, tiredness/exhaustion, backaches, and frequent
urination).

If severe, these symptoms can impede the

performance of basic work duties.
5

Id.

childbirth that can require leave from work for the event and
recovery.7

Because these first two categories of absence deal

primarily with the physiological conditions related to
pregnancy, legislation usually refers to both as forms of
medical leave.8

The third category of absence, referred to as

parental leave, covers leave from work for the employee to care
for and bond with the new child.9
By dividing pregnancy into these separate categories and

7

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (requiring eight

weeks of leave upon the birth of a child). See Mayo Clinic,

Caesarian Birth and the Road to Recovery, CNN.COM, Dec. 21, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/library/PR/ 00101.html (reporting that
vaginal births usually require six weeks of recovery time, while
caesarian births can require up to eight).
8

See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. §

825.114 (2005) (defining “serious medical condition” under the
medical leave provision as any period of incapacity due to
pregnancy or childbirth).
9

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (distinguishing childbirth leave to

allow the employee time to recover from the physical condition
of labor from parental leave to allow the employee time to care
for and bond with her child because childbirth leave requires
medical certification).
6

not treating the condition comprehensively, leave legislation
creates gaps between coverage for medical leave and coverage for
parental leave, during which time the pregnant employee would be
without leave and vulnerable to job termination.10

The seminal

case illustrating this problem is the recent New Jersey Supreme
Court case of Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort.11

In

addition to demonstrating the lack of comprehensive leave for
pregnant employees, Gerety also demonstrates the failure of
anti-discrimination statutes to fill such gaps and protect
pregnant employees from discrimination.12

10

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1334-36 (N.J. 2005) (stating pregnant employees could be
covered for both state medical and federal parental leave).
11

See id. (reporting that a pregnant employee was fired during a

thirteen day gap in leave coverage).
12

See id. at 1242 (finding that the employer’s policy did not

succeed under disparate impact theory because of the policy’s
neutral application). Disparate impact theory involves an

employment practice that is facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but impacts one group more
harshly than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.

Id. at 1237.
7

In Part II, this Comment describes Gerety in detail, along
with the current state of both federal and state leave laws and
federal and state pregnancy discrimination laws.13 In Part III,
this Comment argues that it is the interaction of federal and
state leave laws that most often creates a gap in leave and that
this gap produces a disparate impact on pregnant employees,
which violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.14

Finally, Part

III examines the most common misinterpretations courts make when
examining pregnant employees’ requests for recovery under antidiscrimination laws.15

In conclusion, this Comment advocates for

the treatment of pregnancy as one singular condition under leave
laws, because a holistic approach would more closely mirror

13

See infra Part II.A-B (describing the different ways in which

pregnant employees are covered under state and federal leave
laws and the theories of recovery found in anti-discrimination
statutes).
14

See infra Part III.A (explaining in detail the potential for

gaps within several states and how a reasonable accommodation
standard not only fixes the gap but more realistically meets the
needs of employees and employers).
15

See infra Part III.C (exploring the courts’ misinterpretation

of disparate impact theory and confusion over pregnant women’s
unique position).
8

women’s real world experience with pregnancy and prevent
discriminatory gaps.16
II.

BACKGROUND
Lack of comprehensive leave laws can cause significant harm

to pregnant employees.17

First, without leave and job

protection, a pregnant employee is at risk for termination,
which puts her economic well-being in jeopardy during an already
financially trying time.18

Also, adequate leave time also

assures both the physical and psychological well-being of the

16

See infra Part IV (advocating that a holistic approach is far

superior to the piecemeal fashion in which legislation is
currently being passed).
17

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 7 (stating studies show that

parental leave results in better prenatal and postnatal care,
more intense parental bonding over a child’s lifetime, and lower
accident rates in the first year of life).
18

See CENT.

EXPENDITURES

FOR

ON

NUTRITION

CHILDREN

BY

AND

PUB. POLICY, U.S. DEPT.

OF

AGRIC.,

FAMILIES 2 (2005) (reporting that the

average child-rearing costs in the first year of life for a twochild, married-couple family in the middle-income group was
between $9,840 and $10,900).
9

employee.19

In addition, not only basic fairness but the law

itself dictates that employers should not require pregnant
employees to face gaps in coverage that other non-pregnant
employees do not face.20

Lastly, adequate leave also confers

concrete benefits upon employers.21

19

See Sue Shellenbarger, Shorter Maternity Leaves Are a Danger

to Working Mothers, CAREERJOURNAL.COM: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/ workfamily/20040521workfamily.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (reporting on a
National Bureau of Economic Research study that found mothers
who take at least three months off after childbirth show fifteen
percent fewer symptoms of depression after they return to work).
20

See 124 CONG. REC. 38, 573 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins)

(arguing that the PDA, which legally requires pregnant employees
be treated the same as other employees, ". . . represents only
basic fairness for women employees.").
21

See Christy Ogelsby, More Options for Moms Seeking Work-Family

Balance, CNN.COM, May 10, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001
working.moms/stories/mainstory.html (contending that studies
link the lack of good medical and parental leave to problems for
employers, such as absenteeism and burnout).
10

A.

Gerety and the Gap Created by Current Medical and
Parental Leave Laws

The facts in Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort
clearly illustrate the gap in coverage created by the lack of
comprehensive leave legislation.22

Christina Gerety had worked

for the Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort (“Hilton”) for almost
ten years when she learned that she was pregnant with twins.23
While intending to work during her pregnancy, approximately a
month into her first trimester Gerety took a short leave of
absence due to illness related to her condition.24

Later, upon

the advice of her physician, Gerety requested an extended period
of leave.25

22

Hilton’s leave policy only provided for two types of

See 877 A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. 2005) (reporting that there was

a gap in coverage between when the employee exhausted her
medical leave and when she would have been eligible for parental
leave).
23

See id. at 1234 (reporting that Gerety’s husband also worked

at the Hilton and that they both stayed and worked through a
major change in management).
24

See id. (noting that Gerety only took a two day leave of

absence in the beginning of her pregnancy).
25

See id. (stating that Gerety’s original leave of absence was

to end on Dec. 1st and was later extended through Feb. 1st).
11

leave: (1) leave under federal and state leave legislation, and
(2) fourteen weeks of leave under its own policy.26

Her doctor

certified the first twelve weeks of Gerety’s leave as medical
leave under the main form of federal leave legislation – The
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”).27
In 1993, Congress passed the FMLA in recognition of the
importance of a work and life balance, not only for pregnant
employees but for all employees.28

The FMLA requires that all

large employers provide twelve workweeks of leave during each
twelve-month period.29

An employee can request leave for four

reasons, the two applicable to pregnant employees are the birth
of the employee’s child or because of the employee’s own

26

See id. at 1237 (allowing leave under the federal Family and

Medical Leave Act of 1993 and the New Jersey Family Leave Act).
27

See id. (reporting that up to this point both Gerety and

Hilton anticipated Gerety’s return to work without any adverse
repercussions).
28

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3

(1993) (finding that “the lack of employment policies to
accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose
between job security and parenting.”).
29

See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2005) (defining employers as those with

fifty or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius).
12

“serious health condition.”30

In addition to providing an

employee with twelve weeks of leave, an employer may not
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for
taking advantage of the FMLA and must return the employee to her
original position upon her return from leave.31
During Gerety’s leave, her physicians discovered one of the
babies had a serious health problem and hospitalized Gerety as a
result.32

Based on these developments, her physician recommended

Gerety further extend her absence from work.33

Because she had

exhausted all twelve weeks of FMLA medical leave and the

30

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)

(2005) (stating that the other two reasons for leave are because
the employee has adopted a child or received a foster child or
to care for a family member with a serious health condition).
31

See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2005) (disallowing retaliatory action by

the employer, such as firing or reduction in seniority).
32

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (acknowledging that Gerety had a

bona fide medical concern and that there was no dispute to this
matter).
33

See id. (stating that at this time Gerety’s anticipated due

date was still May, which meant Hilton expected her to need an
addition month of leave then she would have needed due to the
premature birth of the twins).
13

additional fourteen weeks provided to her by Hilton, Hilton
terminated Gerety and told her that while they would consider
rehiring her, she would lose all seniority benefits.34

However,

despite exhausting all twenty-six weeks on medical leave, Gerety
was still eligible for twelve weeks of parental leave under the
New Jersey Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”).35
Several states have their own versions of parental and
medical leave legislation and the FMLA clearly states that the
law does not interfere with or supersede additional leave
provided by state laws.36

Some states, like New Jersey, restrict

leave to cover only medical leave or only parental leave.37

34

When

See id. (stating that the only other option given Gerety by

Hilton was to return to work immediately under New Jersey law).
35

See id. (stating that she would have been eligible for more

leave upon the birth of her children).
36

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (including in this provision any

leave provided under parental and medical leave or antidiscrimination laws); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (2005) (stating
explicitly that employers should feel free to retain or adopt
more generous leave policies).
37

See, e.g., New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §

34:11b-4 (West 2005) (excluding all serious medical conditions,
14

that happens, the state leave does not run concurrent to the
FMLA leave, as it would if both state and federal law covered
the same type of leave.38

As a result, a pregnant employee in

these states is in the same position as Gerety - that is, she
may be eligible for twelve weeks of medical leave under federal
law and an additional twelve weeks of parental leave under state
law.39
Unfortunately, Gerety was unable to take full advantage of
both banks of leave because she was fired before the birth of
her children, which would have triggered eligibility for more
state parental leave.40

The gap in time between the exhaustion

of her medical leave and the birth of her children, which would

including pregnancy-related illness or childbirth, but covering
parental leave).
38

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (stating that leave provided under the

FMLA does not supersede additional state leave coverage, not
equivalent state leave coverage).
39

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1235 (reporting that Gerety would have

been eligible for a total of thirty-eight weeks of leave between
federal leave, state leave, and employer leave).
40

See id. (stating that Hilton fired Gerety after she had used

only 182 days of leave).
15

have triggered her parental leave, was only thirteen days.41

In

other words, if Gerety had begun her medical leave only thirteen
days later, she would have been covered through birth by the
medical leave and after birth by the NJFLA.42

Thus, despite

going over Hilton’s twenty-six week leave policy, the NJFLA
would have prohibited Hilton from terminating her employment
because she took parental leave.43

However, because of the gap

in coverage, the law left Gerety without leave and without
protection.44

41

See id. (reporting that Hilton fired Gerety on April 2nd and

that she went into labor and delivered twin daughters on April
14th).
42

See id. (showing that if she had begun her leave in mid-

October the twenty-six weeks of leave would have reached until
the birth of her children in mid-April).
43

See New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11b-4

(West 2005) (prohibiting the termination or denial of seniority
benefits upon return from leave to employees taking the parental
leave).
44

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1235 (stating Gerety was left without

options and filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the federal agency charged with
enforcing Title VII).
16

B.

Gerety and the Hesitation of Courts to Find Disparate
Impact in Pregnancy Discrimination Cases

After her termination, Gerety filed a gender discrimination
claim under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”)
alleging that Hilton’s policy had a disparate impact on pregnant
employees.45
The LAD is the equivalent of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the federal anti-discrimination law, which
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.46

In the first ten

years after enactment, the majority of state and federal courts
interpreted sex discrimination under Title VII to include
pregnancy discrimination.47

45

Despite this precedent set by other

See id. (reporting that the plaintiff also alleged wrongful

termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
retaliatory action against her husband).
46

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2 (a)(1) (2005) (including prohibition against
discrimination with regards to “compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment . . . ”).
47

See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519

F.2d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1975) (dismissing employer policy that
did not pay disability benefits for pregnancy or childbirth17

courts, the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
clearly stated that Title VII did not cover pregnancy
discrimination.48

Congress quickly responded to the Court’s

decision by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) as
an amendment to Title VII that states the terms:
‘[B]ecause of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work.49
Not only did the amendment include pregnancy in the definition
of sex discrimination, the PDA codified what state courts had
been requiring from employers for several years – that employers

related absences as discriminatory under Title VII); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(maintaining that the school board’s policy of firing employees
if they did not return three months after birth was a violation
of Title VII).
48

See 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (stating that there was no way to

prove that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits were designed to
discriminate and that the plaintiff failed to prove the neutral
plan had a disparate impact on women).
49

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
18

must treat pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition
the same as any other temporary disability.50
As previously mentioned, several states have their own
anti-discrimination law; and after the passage of the PDA, it
was unclear whether or not the federal law pre-empted any state
laws offering more expansive coverage.51

In California Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court looked at a California
statute that required every pregnant employee to receive up to
four months of leave for either pregnancy or childbirth, even if
other employees received less temporary disability leave.52

In

its analysis, the Court found that the state law was not

50

See 37 Questions & Answers, 29 C.F.R. Part 1604, Appendix

(EEOC 1978) (appending the guidelines to Title VII with these
Questions and Answers for employees to provide guidance on the
interpretation of the new amendment).
51

See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,

273 (1987) (considering whether or not Title VII pre-empted a
state anti-discrimination law that required leave in addition to
prohibiting discrimination and finding there was no preemption).
52

See id. at 276 (evaluating the plaintiff’s claim that the job-

protected leave was denied to her because upon her return she
was refused an equivalent position).
19

inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII and that the federal
law did not pre-empt the state law.53
In examining Gerety’s claim of discrimination under the
NJFLA, the court stated that it would look to the “substantive
and procedural standards established” under Title VII in
determining discrimination claims.54

Since Title VII now

explicitly covers pregnancy as a form of sex-based
discrimination, federals courts have stated repeatedly that
plaintiffs, like Gerety, would have the same two legal theories
available to them as any other Title VII plaintiff, including
disparate impact theory.55

53

Since the LAD is New Jersey’s version

See id. at 285 (quoting and agreeing with the Court of Appeals

that Congress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop -- not a ceiling
above which they may not rise”).
54

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1237 (N.J. 2005) (quoting Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co.,
Inc., 173 N.J. 1, 13 (2002)) (finding that federal standards had
been applied however with flexibility).
55

See Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867

F.2d 974, 984

(7th Cir. 1988) (holding explicitly for the first

time that PDA claims may be brought under both disparate impact
and disparate treatment theory); see also McDonnell Douglas
20

of Title VII, the court allows the use of both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories, focusing in particular
in Gerety on the plaintiff’s claim of disparate impact.56
Under this theory, an employee can prove a violation of the
PDA based on the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy,
like Hilton’s leave policy, on a protected group, here, pregnant
women.57

The employer can defend itself by proving that the

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (explaining the other
theory available to the plaintiffs, disparate treatment, as
combating intentional, willful discrimination against members of
a protected class and setting out a test to prove this type of
discrimination).
56

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1237 (focusing only on the disparate

impact claim because it was the only theory presented during
argument).
57

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)

(finding that an employer’s requirement of a high school
education or a general intelligence test had an adverse impact
on black applicants); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (stating that statistical
evidence played an important role in proving disparate impact,
particularly in employment cases).
21

practice is a job-related business necessity.58

However, even if

the employer establishes business necessity, the employee can
still prevail if she can prove that there was a less
discriminatory policy that would "serve the employer's
legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.'"59

In addition, the employee is under no

requirement during any point in this process to prove that the
employer had a discriminatory motive.60

58

See De Laurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d

674 (1978) (finding a school district correctly asserted a
business necessity defense where they prohibited pregnant
teachers from working during the ninth month of pregnancy
because of safety and efficiency concerns related to a
teacher’s multifarious duties).
59

See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)) (finding
that a height and weight requirement for prison guards had a
disparate impact on women and limiting the tasks available to
women guards had a less discriminatory impact).
60

See id. at 335-36 (clarifying that the legislative intent of

Title VII was to prevent discriminatory consequences not
discriminatory motives).
22

However, while disparate impact theory is available to
pregnant employees facing discrimination, as the court shows in

Gerety, plaintiffs have had a difficult time proving their
case.61

First, while the Seventh Circuit stated that disparate

impact was applicable to pregnancy discrimination claims in

Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly declared its applicability, and many
districts and several circuits hold that it is not available in
pregnancy discrimination cases.62
Second, in addition to overall reluctance on the part of

61

See Pamela L. Perry, Let Them Become Professionals: An

Analysis of the Failure to Enforce Title VII’s Pay Equity
Mandate, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 136-39 (1991) (noting the
courts’ historical resistance to disparate impact theory in all
gender discrimination contexts).
62

See Laura Schlictmann, Accommodation of Pregnancy-Related

Disabilities on the Job, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 373
(1994) (arguing that the closest the Court has come in
addressing the issue was in California Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Guerra, where the Court looked at a California law that
required enhanced leave for pregnant employees).

Despite the

Supreme Court’s quoting a seminal disparate impact case, they
held the state law was not pre-empted by Title VII.
23

Id.

the Court, many courts have stated that the PDA requires only
equal treatment between pregnant employees and non-pregnant, but
similarly disabled, employees.63

This seems to be the conclusion

of the majority in Gerety, which granted the employer’s motion
for summary judgment based solely upon the policy’s neutral
application and the fact that the policy was not subject to any
exception, no matter the employee’s illness.64
However, other courts have held that the PDA can require
leave for pregnant employees claiming disparate impact.65

63

In

See, e.g., EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d

944, 949 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that pregnant employee’s only
had access to disparate treatment analysis, as opposed to
disparate impact analysis, because Title VII only required
neutral application).
64

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1242 (N.J. 2005) (claiming that the case was about
preferential treatment for pregnant employees and not freedom
from discrimination).
65

See, e.g., Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 994

(5th Cir. 1982) (finding that an employer’s policy of
terminating pregnant employees because of concerns with fetal
safety had a disparate impact and was discriminatory because the
employer failed to use alternative, less discriminatory policy);
24

Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, the court found the
employer’s policy of allowing only a ten-day leave, while
applied equally to both pregnant and non-pregnant employees, was
still discriminatory towards pregnant employees.66

This is the

position taken by the dissent in Gerety, which argues that
Hilton’s policy does have a disparate impact on pregnant
employees, that the LAD prohibits this form of discrimination,
and that it is within the power of the courts to require
reasonable accommodation of pregnant employees.67
III. ANALYSIS

Gerety is the paradigmatic case illustrating how the

Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1554 (11th Cir.
1984) (finding disparate impact where employer had failed to
establish a business necessity for firing a female x-ray
technician when she became pregnant).
66

See 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that it was

“[b]eyond peradventure, the limitation of leave to ten days
affected women employed in the PEP program much more severely
. . . ”).
67

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Portiz, C.J. dissenting)

(arguing that the case is not about preferential treatment, but
about women being treated unfairly and differently than nonpregnant employees).
25

separation of pregnancy into distinct categories of absences
under both state and federal leave legislation creates potential
gaps between the different categories of leave.68 These gaps in
leave not only require women to separate their one condition in
order to meet differing leave standards69 but also expose
pregnant employees to a risk of termination or loss of benefits
not faced by non-pregnant employees.70
clearly prohibited by the PDA.71

This disparate impact is

However, as the majority

decision in Gerety shows, disparate impact theory under anti-

68

See id. (stating the gap was created between the first

category of medical leave and the third category of parental
leave).
69

See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2005)

(setting a certification standard for pregnancy-related illness
leave higher and harder to reach than the standard for
childbirth or parental leave).
70

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (stating Gerety was fired upon

expiration of leave and told she could be rehired but would lose
all seniority benefits).
71

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(stating clearly that pregnant employees must be treated the
same as “persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . .”).
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discrimination statutes has not always been successful in
protecting pregnant employees facing such gaps.72
A.

State Leave Legislation: The Separation of Pregnancy
into Distinct Categories of Absences Creates Gaps in
Leave Coverage that Have an Disparate Impact on
Pregnant Employees in Violation of the PDA

The court in Gerety correctly called on state lawmakers to
respond to the needs of pregnant women with legislation that
requires enhanced leave that would prevent gaps in coverage from
occurring.73

Unfortunately, it is precisely such responses by

state lawmakers that have created the gap in the first place;
therefore, any future legislation will need to look closely at
the examples of several states whose leave legislation prevents
potential gaps from forming.74

72

See id. at 1240 (finding that Hilton’s leave policy did not

have a disparate impact on pregnant women because it would also
impact men facing gender-specific medical conditions such as
testicular cancer).
73

See id. at 1241 (arguing that it is the legislature’s job to

require enhanced leave and that the Court can not “legislate our
personal preferences . . . ”).
74

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2005) (requiring that

employers with three or more employees grant pregnant employees
a reasonable leave of absence for pregnancy-related illness,
27

1.

The FMLA Creates Separate and Discriminatory
Standards for Pregnant Employees to Meet and Does
Not Provide an Adequate Amount of Leave

The FMLA alone has fallen short of meeting the needs of
pregnant employees, and several states have responded with
legislation to address those inadequacies.75

First, the

separation of pregnancy under the FMLA into three categories of
absences forces pregnant employees to meet stricter eligibility
requirements for leave for illnesses related to gestation than
required for childbirth leave.76

Second, by only covering twelve

weeks of leave, the FMLA makes gaps in leave coverage more

which would prevent gaps from forming by not setting distinct
time limits).
75

See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300-3306 (2005) (addressing

the one problem with the FMLA, the fact that most families
cannot afford to take unpaid leave, by becoming the first state
in the nation to provide paid leave to employees for the care of
their newborn child).
76

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612

(2005) (requiring employees taking medical leave for pregnancyrelated illness to prove that their symptoms are a serious
medical condition).
28

likely, especially in the case of high-risk pregnancies.77
While the FMLA made inroads into the needs of pregnant
employees, the separate treatment of pregnancy and childbirth
within the law creates different eligibility requirements for
coverage, which can have a discriminatory impact on pregnant
employees.78

The FMLA automatically covers the birth of an

employee’s child under either the first provision providing
parental leave or the fourth provision providing medical leave.79
However, the FMLA would not automatically cover a pregnant
employee, like Gerety, who wants to use the medical leave for

77

See Multiple Pregnancies: Maternal Complications, WOMEN’S HEALTH

CHANNEL, http://www.womenshealthchannel.com/multiplepregnancies/
risks_maternal.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (stating that
multiple births are twelve times more likely to be premature and
therefore, often require long periods of bed rest for the
mother).
78

See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (requiring pregnancy-related illness to

meet the requirements for “serious medical condition,” while not
requiring childbirth to meet any standards).

As a result, only

pregnant women would be required to differentiate symptoms
within one medical condition.
79

Id.

See id. (noting that the adoption of a child would also be

automatically covered for parental leave).
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illness related to gestation before childbirth and would require
her to prove that the illness qualified as a “serious medical
condition” which would prevent her from performing the essential
functions of her job.80
The FMLA classifies serious medical condition as falling in
one of two categories; pregnancy-related illness falls in the
second category, as a condition that requires “continuing care
by a health care provider.”81

Congress originally envisioned

this category as covering all illnesses related to gestation,
including common symptoms.82

80

In addition, the legislature

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.115

(2005) (using the definition of disability within the Americans
With Disabilities Act, which is that the employee be unable to
perform the essential functions of the position).
81

See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2005) (defining serious health

condition as any condition that requires (A) inpatient care in a
hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B)
continuing treatment by a health care provider).
82

See H.R. REP. NO.8, 103RD CONG., 1ST SESS., pt. 1 at 29 (1993)

(listing among the conditions to be covered “ongoing pregnancy,
miscarriages, complications or illnesses related to pregnancy,
such as severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal care,
childbirth and recovery from childbirth . . . ”).
30

explicitly lists “any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or
for prenatal care” as included within the continuing care test.83
However, pregnancy claims were the among the first tried
under the serious medical condition provision of the FMLA and
the courts incorrectly strayed from this legislative intent
immediately by requiring that pregnancy-related absences be the
result of severe symptoms.84

In particular, in Gudenkauf v.

Stauffer Commc’n, Inc. the court denied an employee’s FMLA
claim, despite the presence of morning sickness, stress, nausea,
back pain, swelling, and headaches, wrongly concluding that
these were no more than the normal complications of pregnancy
and did not prevent the employee from performing the essential
functions of her job, in direct conflict with the legislative

83

See 29 C.F.R. 825.114(a)(2) (listing prenatal care separately

from incapacity related to pregnancy).
84

See Kindlesparker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Comp., No. 94-C-

7542, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6164, at *1 (D. Ill. May 8, 1995)
(assessing a plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged when her
pregnancy required medical attention and denying relief because
her pregnancy was not a serious medical condition, because it
did not involve severe symptoms).
31

intent expressed for the FMLA.85

Under the current standard, the

FMLA would provide leave to a pregnant employee for a normal
childbirth without complications, but not for a normal illness
related to gestation, and in fact, would require a pregnant
employee to prove her symptoms are severe.86

While this higher

standard was not difficult for Gerety to meet because of the
high-risk nature of her pregnancy, a pregnant employee
attempting to receive medical leave for normal pregnancy-related
illness essentially would face a much stricter standard than a
pregnant employee attempting to receive medical or parental
leave for childbirth.87
By differentiating between pregnancy-related illness and

85

See 922 F. Supp. 465, 469 (D. Kan. 1996) (accepting the

incapacity requirement, that the employee be unable to perform
the essential functions of her position, as controlling).
86

See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2005) (allowing the employer to require

the employee to seek a second opinion if he or she doubts the
results of the first certification of leave).
87

See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2005)

(covering work absences for the birth or care of a child, the
adoption of a child, to care for an ill family member, or for
the employee’s own illness that makes it impossible to perform
the essential functions of her job).
32

childbirth, this requirement forces pregnant employees to look
at her pregnancy as separate conditions and meet differing
standards based on the stage of her conditions, something a nonpregnant employee would not be required to do.88

As a result of

these different standards, an employer can treat a pregnant
employee differently than a non-pregnant employee.89

However,

this different treatment clearly violates the PDA by treating
pregnant employees differently than non-pregnant employees by
requiring of them what would not be required of others, which
creates a disparate impact on pregnant employees.90

88

See id. (requiring pregnancy-related illness to be severe and

incapacitating, while not requiring the presence of abnormal
severity for childbirth).
89

See William McDevitt, Evaluating the Current Judicial

Interpretation of “Serious Health Condition” Under the FMLA, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 697, 716 (1997) (calling on the Supreme Court
to define a bona fide period of incapacity or prenatal care,
therefore decreasing the difference in the standard for
childbirth and pregnancy).
90

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(requiring all pregnant employees be treated the same as
similarly disabled employees for all “employee-related purposes
. . . ”).
33

The FMLA has also fallen short of its goals of meeting the
needs of working mothers and contributes to the gaps in coverage
by providing inadequate amounts of leave time.

91

While it has

added greatly to the rights of pregnant employees by providing
leave where before none was available, by not acknowledging that
pregnancy sometimes requires enhanced leave, the FMLA increases
the likelihood of gaps in coverage.

Beyond the general

eligibility requirements that exclude a large number of
employees, the twelve weeks provided for both pregnancy-related
illness and childbirth under the FMLA falls far short of meeting
the realistic needs of most pregnant women, in particular women
like Gerety experiencing complications from a high-risk
pregnancy that can require extensive leave.92

Since there is

only one bank of twelve weeks from which an employee can draw
both pregnancy and childbirth leave, there is a high likelihood
a pregnant employee will quickly exhaust her FMLA leave far

91

See Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 6 (stating that women can

require anywhere from six weeks to several months of leave
because of pregnancy-related illness, childbirth, or bonding
time).
92

See Multiple Pregnancies, supra note 77 (stating that because

of the multitude of risks involved in multiple births, large
amounts of leave are often required).
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before the birth of her child.93
2.

By Separating Pregnancy into Distinct Categories
of Absences, State Legislatures Have Created
Discriminatory Gaps Between Medical Leave and
Parental Leave Which Creates a Disparate Impact
on Pregnant Employees in Violation of the PDA

Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted
legislation that provides medical and/or parental leave above
and beyond that offered under the FMLA.94

Notwithstanding the

differences between states, most state legislatures have
followed the scheme of the FMLA and have separated pregnancy
into distinct categories of absences.95

In addition, several

states, like New Jersey, have restricted the leave to one

93

See, e.g., Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Report, 877

A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. 2005) (stating that Gerety exhausted all
twelve weeks of FMLA leave while still in the second trimester
of her pregnancy).
94

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 17 (listing California,

Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Washington as providing expanded leave).
95

See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2004) (using the same language of

the FMLA, “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
. . . ,” to describe the distinct categories).
35

category of absence, and in so doing, create a potential gap
between medical and parental leave, as illustrated in Gerety.96
Since pregnant employees face a gap in leave not faced by nonpregnant employees taking temporary disability leave, this
creates a disparate impact on pregnant employees, which is
violative of the PDA.97
State legislatures provide additional, but restricted,
leave for pregnant employees in several ways.98

First, the

majority of states with enhanced leave legislation provide an
additional bank of time accessible for either medical leave or

96

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:341 (2005) (limiting leave

only to medical conditions associated with pregnancy and
childbirth and excluding parental leave).
97

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(prohibiting dissimilar treatment between pregnant employees and
non-pregnant employees, particularly when it comes to the
benefits of employment).
98

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 6 (describing the ways in

which legislators provide leave including: parental leave,
medical leave, paid leave, sick leave flexibility, and
disability benefits).
36

parental leave.99

Some states, like Iowa, Louisiana, and New

York, restrict the use of leave only to medical conditions
related to pregnancy.100

Because it excludes parental leave, the

FMLA considers this state leave additional, and therefore, the
law would cover a pregnant employee for another twelve weeks of
parental leave under the FMLA upon the birth of her child.101
For example, if Gerety were within such a state, she would have

99

See id. (listing Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,

Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont as providing
anywhere from six to twenty-six weeks additional medical leave
for pregnant employees).
100

See IOWA CODE § 216.6(2) (requiring employers with four or more

employees to provide eight weeks of leave); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:342 (2005) (requiring employers with twenty-five or more
employees to provide a reasonable amount of leave, not to exceed
sixteen weeks); N.Y. WORKER’S COMP. LAW § 205 (Consol. 2005)
(requiring employers with one or more employees to provide
twenty-six weeks of leave).
101

Compare IOWA CODE § 216.6(2) (granting eight weeks of leave for

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions for
employees at businesses with four or more employees), with 29
U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of leave for the birth of
an employee’s child at a business with fifty or more employees).
37

fallen in another gap; however, she would have first exhausted
the state leave during her pregnancy and been eligible for
federal leave upon the birth of her twins.102

Therefore, the

exclusion of parental leave under state law creates a gap in
leave, which would not be faced by non-pregnant employees.

In

this gap, any pregnant employee would be vulnerable to
termination or loss of seniority, a disparate impact not felt by
non-pregnant employees facing temporary disability.

103

The reverse is true in other states where the exclusion of
medical leave under state law creates a gap, like the one in

Gerety, between federally provided medical leave and state
provided parental leave.104

Other states, such as Massachusetts

and Minnesota, have legislation like the NJFLA that limits leave
for pregnant employees to parental leave and excludes medical

102

See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (recognizing that both medical and

parental leave are triggered by childbirth).
103

See id. (stating that the employer would have rehired Gerety,

but she would have lost almost ten years of seniority).
104

Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of medical

leave), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (providing
eight weeks of leave for the birth of a child).
38

leave for pregnancy-related illness.105

Again, because of the

separation into distinct categories of absence and the exclusion
of one category, the FMLA would consider leave provided for
pregnancy-related medical condition to be in addition to any
state provided parental leave.106

Therefore, like in Gerety, the

gap existed where the employee exhausted all of her FMLA medical
leave on pregnancy-related illness only days before the birth of
her twins, when she would have been eligible for state parental
leave.107

This gap and the risk of termination that accompanies

it have a disparate impact on pregnant employees, which is in
direct violation of the PDA.108

105

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (requiring eight

weeks of leave for childbirth); MINN. STAT. § 181.941 (2004)
(requiring six weeks of leave for the birth of a child).
106

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (prohibiting leave provided under

the FMLA from superseding any additional leave provided under
state law).
107

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1236 (2005) (reporting that plaintiff exhausted leave and
was fired on April 2nd and gave birth on April 14th).
108

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(prohibiting discrimination in employment between pregnant and
non-pregnant employees).
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The first two ways states provide enhanced leave create
gaps in the law by excluding one category of leave.109

The third

way states provide enhanced leave is by providing one bank of
time that is available for both medical and parental leave,
which avoids such the gap and therefore does not violate the
PDA.110

As previously mentioned, when state leave provides for

both medical and parental leave as covered by the provisions of
the FMLA, the leave is not considered additional to the FMLA and
the state leave runs concurrent with the federal leave.111
Therefore, states can provide enhanced leave through increasing
the amount of leave provided or by decreasing the number of
employees required for eligibility, but by still covering both
medical and parental leave in one bank of time they avoid gaps

109

Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of medical

leave), with MINN. STAT. § 181.941 (2004) (requiring six weeks of
leave for the birth of a child).
110

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (providing ten

weeks for both medical and parental leave).
111

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (prohibiting federal parental and

medical leave from superseding only state parental and medical
leave laws that provide additional leave).
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between state and federal leave.112

For example, both Maine and

Vermont provide leave to more of their citizens by reducing the
number of employees needed for eligibility; however, they avoid
a gap between federal and state leave by expressly providing for
both medical and parental leave so that the pregnant employee is
not eligible for both state and federal leave.113

Even if an

employer had enough employees to qualify for FMLA, and
therefore, by default, the lesser requirements under state leave
laws, any pregnant employees would not be eligible for both
state and federal leave.114

112

If Gerety were to have been employed

See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (2005) (requiring

employers with ten employees or more to provide leave, as
opposed to the FMLA’s eligibility requirement of fifty or more
employees).
113

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (requiring an

employer with fifteen or more employees to provide ten weeks of
leave for the birth of a child or a serious health condition);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (requiring employers with ten
employees or more to provide twelve weeks of leave for
pregnancy-related medical conditions or to care for a newborn
child).
114

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (allowing only additional state leave

not equivalent state leave).
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in one of these states, only one bank of twelve weeks would have
been available to her under both state and federal leave and
there would have been no discriminatory gap.115
The fourth way states provide enhanced leave is by going
far beyond the FMLA in meeting the needs of pregnant employees
by providing additional banks of time for both medical and
parental leave, instead of the one bank of time accessible for
both.116

As previously mentioned, if both state and federal

legislation cover a pregnant employee for both parental and
medical leave, she is not eligible for twice the leave.117
Therefore, in these states, there is no potential gap between

115

Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 26, § 844 (covering pregnancy,

birth, and the care of an infant), with 29 U.S.C. § 2612
(covering pregnancy, birth, and the care of an infant).
116

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 17 (giving California an A-

for providing additional leave time for both pregnancy-related
medical leave and parental leave to care for a newborn, with
Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Oregon following closely
behind with B+’s because they do not provide paid leave as does
California).
117

See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (prohibiting federal parental and

medical leave from superseding any state parental and medical
leave laws).
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federal and state leave.

However, because these states still

set finite time limits on medical leave, there is a potential
gap between the state provided medical and parental leave.118
For example, in Gerety’s case, the large amount of absence
required as a result of her high-risk pregnancy makes it very
likely she would have exhausted even the most generous state
provided medical leave and faced a gap before the beginning of
further parental leave provided by the state.
Many work and family groups recognize California as a
leader in providing enhanced medical and parental leave to its
citizens.119

However, despite its generous leave provisions,

Gerety would still face a potential gap between the state’s
medical leave and parental leave for pregnant employees.

As

discussed previously with regards to Guerra, California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) requires all private
employers with five or more employees to provide up to four
months of unpaid job-protected leave for pregnancy-related

118

See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 51.659 (2005) (providing twelve

weeks of pregnancy-related medical leave and twelve weeks of
parental leave upon the birth of a child).
119

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 20-21 (commending California

as an innovator in parental leave because of the combination of
unpaid leave and paid leave).
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medical conditions.120

Since the coverage focuses on the

physiological aspect of pregnancy, it covers childbirth.121
The leave provided under the FEHA is in addition to any
leave the pregnant employee takes under the second bank of leave
provided by California in the Family Rights Act (“FRA”).122

An

employee is eligible for an additional twelve weeks upon the
birth of the child under the FRA.123

The FRA shares almost all

of its provisions and much of its legislative history with the

120

See Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945

(b) (2) (West 2005) (requiring employers to provide leave
regardless of the amount of time the woman has worked for the
employer and the number of hours she has worked).
121

See id. at § 12945 (a) (waiving a length of service

requirement and allowing the employee to use any accrued sick
leave or vacation time, but still requiring notice to the
employer).
122

See Liu v. Amway Corp. 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004)

(finding that a pregnant employee was entitled to unpaid leave
under FMLA after her FEHA pregnancy disability leave expired).
123

See California Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §

12945.2(c)(3)(A) (2005) (allocating twelve weeks of parental
leave similar to the provisions of the FMLA, except for the
exclusion of medical leave).
44

FMLA.124

However, with regards to pregnant employees, they

differ in one important way – the provision of the FRA that
allows leave for serious medical conditions excludes any
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.125

Under

the FRA, an employee, such as Gerety, would be eligible for
coverage upon the birth of her child, despite the fact that the
coverage excludes actual childbirth.126
However, despite these two generous allotments of leave
under both the FEHA and the FRA, Gerety would have exhausted her
pregnancy-related illness leave two months before the birth of
her twins, a larger gap then she faced under Hilton’s policy.

124

See GRANT

ET AL.,

127

supra note 4, at 7 (noting the legislative

findings of both laws explore the changing workforce and the
challenges of such changes).
125

See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945.2(a),(b) (allowing leave for the

“birth of an employee’s child” however excluding pregnancyrelated disabilities including childbirth).
126

See id. (requiring fifty or more employees for an employee to

be eligible for leave, greatly reducing the number of citizens
with access to such leave).
127

See id. at 1234 (reporting that Gerety was on leave for

twenty-six weeks, which would have been beyond the twenty-four
covered under California law).
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However, by extending a maximum of four months of medical leave,
California does extend leave to employees whose employer’s
policy would not be as generous as Hilton’s.128

Of course, the

most extreme of high-risk pregnancies like Gerety’s would still
run out of leave.129

As a result of this gap and the

accompanying risk of termination, any pregnant employee would
face a disparate impact not faced by non-pregnant employees,
which is a violation of the PDA.
4.

A Reasonable Accommodation Standard Prevents a
Discriminatory Gap in Leave Coverage

Three states function under the standard of leave called
for by the dissent in Gerety.130

128

Connecticut, Hawaii, and

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Portiz, C.J. dissenting) (acknowledging
that Hilton’s policy of providing an additional fourteen weeks
of leave above and beyond what was required by law was very
generous, but that it still did not change the fact that the
impact of the policy was discriminatory).
129

See Multiple Pregnancies, supra note 77 (noting that women

pregnant with twins or other multiples are more likely to need
several months of leave prior to the birth of their children).
130

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
46

Montana require reasonable accommodation for women taking
pregnancy-related disability leave.131

Reasonable accommodation

for pregnancy is based on the standard of reasonable
accommodation for disabilities under the American with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).132

Several courts have found that

federal and state anti-discrimination laws only require that
employers treat pregnant employees the same as other temporarily

the court should require that employers institute a flexible
leave policy in order to reasonably accommodate pregnant
employees).
131

See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2005) (requiring employers with

three or more employees to grant “a reasonable leave of absence”
for pregnancy-related disabilities); HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 12-46-108
(2005) (requiring all employers to grant job-protection for a
“reasonable period of time” for disability due to pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical condition).
132

See D'Andra Millsap, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in

the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1412, 1430 (1996) (forcing employers to
accommodate a disabled person’s need either through making
physical changes to the workplace or changing the work
environment or structure).
47

disabled employees.133

Instead of setting a ceiling above which

employers cannot rise, a reasonable accommodation sets a floor
below which they cannot sink by investing pregnant employees
with an affirmative right to be treated according to their needs
instead of the needs of employees in very different medical
situations.134

By creating a flexible standard for the amount of

leave employers allow a pregnant employee to take, pregnant
employees would no longer face finite amounts of medical leave
that could potentially run out before childbirth and would have
access to whatever meets their needs.135

133

Therefore, pregnant

See EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 949

(10th Cir. 1992) (finding that employers were only required to
treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees with
temporary disabilities).
134

See id. at 1433 (examining the equal treatment standard and

special treatment standards within the PDA and arguing that
reasonable accommodation avoids the pitfalls of a male-centered
norm found in the equal treatment standard and discrimination
problems when special treatment is required).
135

See, e.g., Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §

12945 (2005) (requiring employers to grant leave for pregnancyrelated illness, but strictly limiting the amount to four
months).
48

employees would not face potential gaps in coverage between
medical and parental leave because they would be reasonably
covered, especially in the case of high-risk birth presenting
clear disabilities, until childbirth.

Without these gaps, state

legislatures would prevent this form of disparate impact on
pregnant employees and, therefore, violations of the PDA.
PDA equal treatment has always been difficult to understand
and enforce because there is no male equivalent to pregnancy.136
Instead of trying to force pregnant employees into a standard
and workplaces not designed with their needs in mind, a
reasonable accommodation standard forces the employer to change
the workplace to meet the needs of pregnant employees.137
Reasonable accommodation requires case-by-case analysis that
would not only prevent unfair comparisons, but also prevent
discriminatory gaps or disparate impacts, like the one present
in Gerety, by providing leave for clearly disabling pregnancy-

136

See Millsap, supra note 132, at 1424 (criticizing the equal

treatment standard because the inherent standard is a malecentered standard with women struggling to “become more like
men.”).
137

See id. at 1434 (arguing that since every employee has their

own standard upon which to be judged there are no unnecessary
comparisons).
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related illness up until birth.138
As a result of Gerety, a bill recently passed in the New
Jersey Senate that expressly adds familial status to the state’s
LAD and adopts the reasonable accommodation standard called for
by the dissent in Gerety.139

Senate Bill 2522 expressly provides

for “reasonable accommodations for pregnancy or pregnancyrelated conditions unless to do so would impose an undue
hardship upon the employer.”140

By requiring a reasonable

accommodation standard, the New Jersey Senate will prevent any
leave gaps from forming, which will put pregnant employees on
equal footing with non-pregnant employees as required by the
PDA.

138

See id. at 1435 (preventing the blanket-policies that

discriminate against women because of the perceived “special
treatment” required by forcing the employer to deal with the
individual accommodations needed by the employees).
139

See S. 2522, 211th Leg., 2004-2005 Sess. (N.J. 2005)

(including independent contractors within the definition of
employee).
140

Id.

See Assemb. 4157, 211th Leg., 2004-2005 Sess. (N.J.

2005) (awaiting posting by the Speaker of the House so that the
bill can come to the floor for a vote).
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B.

Gerety: Courts Have Misinterpreted Disparate Impact
Theory As Only Requiring Equal Access to Leave and
Have Ignored the Unique Nature of Pregnancy that
Creates Per Se Discrimination with Disparate Impact

The court in Gerety explored whether or not plaintiffs can
use anti-discrimination statutes to force employers to fill the
gaps in leave faced by pregnant employees.141

The court made

several mistakes in examining this issue, which are reflective
of the uphill battle all plaintiffs face in using disparate
impact theory.142
First, courts have incorrectly interpreted the PDA as only
requiring that pregnant employees have equal access to the
employer’s current temporary disability policy.143

141

Therefore,

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d

1233, 1233 (2005) (concluding that a plaintiff is not asking for
judicial remedy in facing discriminatory treatment, but rather
is asking for preferential treatment).
142

See id. at 1234 (describing the company’s policy as allowing

twelve weeks of leave under either the FMLA or New Jersey’s
Family Leave Act, in addition to fourteen weeks provided by the
company).
143

See EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 949

(10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the PDA only required neutral
51

even when the courts allow disparate impact theory to be used,
their analysis ends with proof of neutral application.144
However, if the PDA only required neutral application of the
policy already in place, then it would fall far short of truly
protecting pregnant employees and disparate impact theory would
be completely ineffective.
For example, the court in Gerety made the same mistake by
finding that New Jersey’s anti-discrimination statute only
requires neutral application and equating that requirement with
the requirement of disparate impact theory.145

However, as the

dissent argued, the court has been granted the “broad remedial
purpose” of eliminating all discrimination and that mere neutral
application falls far short of achieving that goal.146

If the

application between pregnant employees and non-pregnant, but
similarly disabled, employees).
144

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1240-42 (misinterpreting the

requirements of disparate impact and incorrectly rejecting
pregnant women as a protected class).
145

See id. at 1240 (stating that there is no disparate impact

because there was gender-neutral application which is “what the
LAD requires . . . ”).
146

See id. at 1243 (disagreeing that the judiciary usurps

legislative function in requiring enhanced leave and stating
52

PDA only required neutral application then disparate impact
theory would be inapposite because its is to provide remedy in
the case of discrimination even if there is neutral
application.147

Therefore, the requirement is that the plaintiff

proves a discriminatory impact and successfully defends any
claims by the employer of business necessity.148

If a plaintiff

could only succeed in circumstances where there was no facially
neutral policy, then discriminatory impact would be completely
unnecessary because all such claims would fall under a disparate
treatment analysis.149

that the LAD would be ineffective without judicial
intervention).
147

See United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar,

777 A.2d 950, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding
disparate impact when a facially neutral policy “resulted in a
significantly disproportionate or adverse impact members of the
affected class . . . ”).
148

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000e-2 (2005) (requiring only discriminatory impact not
discriminatory motive).
149

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801

(1973) (stating that an employee can establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment by showing that she belongs to a
53

By focusing only on application, the court never truly
examined the impact of Hilton’s policy on Gerety and other
pregnant employees.150

The court only mentioned that additional

leave would have been available to Gerety after childbirth and
ignored completely the thirteen-day gap between when the
employer fired the plaintiff and when the state would have
provided her with additional leave for childbirth.151

The court

never even alluded to the fact that Mr. Gerety also had a baby
but was not fired.

152

When courts focus only on neutral

protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a job,
despite that she was rejected, and that after this rejection,
the position remained open).
150

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1240 (examining no statistics with

regards to the impact on pregnant women of the policy or even
selective individual evidence beyond that presented by Gerety
herself).
151

See id. at 1241 (mentioning additional leave when expounding

on the “generosity” of

Hilton’s policy and how it far surpassed

the requirements of the law but failing to mention the gap the
policy created).
152

See id. at 1246 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out that

Mr. Gerety was able to keep his job and that the fact that Mrs.
54

application, they ignore impacts such as these.

While not every

pregnant employee works with her spouse, so that the court can
clearly see a discriminatory impact, disparate impact can be
proven by looking to the male employees with children who escape
the birth of a child without job-related harm.

In Gerety’s

case, it is not only that her husband did not lose his job, but
also that the law would not force other temporarily disabled
employees to separate their condition into distinct categories
and face gaps in coverage between those categories.
Second, courts continually refuse to see pregnancy as a
medical condition unique to women and therefore, any leave
policy affecting only pregnant women should be seen as per se
discrimination, as stated in the PDA.153

The court in Gerety

concludes that pregnancy is a medical condition unique to women,
but that with regards to leave, pregnancy is no different than
medical conditions affecting only men, such as testicular

Gerety was not, is precisely what the Court stated antidiscrimination laws were trying to prevent).
153

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(stating clearly that pregnancy is unique to women and therefore
should be included in the definition of gender discrimination).
55

cancer.154
The court’s logic was erroneous for a number of reasons.
First, as the plaintiff argues, pregnancy is very different from
a gender-specific cancer, primarily because cancer affects both
genders in specific ways.155

More importantly, however, the

legislature rejected this reasoning, present since Gilbert, with
the PDA specifically because it treats pregnancy only as a
medical condition, instead of as a unique characteristic that
creates groups composed entirely of women.156

Instead, the court

stated that Gerety was requesting preferential treatment, not
protection from discrimination, which the court concluded was

154

See id. at 1240 (asserting that the plaintiff would require

more leave for a pregnant woman than a woman suffering from
ovarian cancer).
155

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1241 (responding to plaintiff’s

argument that both sexes can be affected by cancer by arguing
that pregnant women should not be afforded more leave than women
with ovarian cancer).
156

See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130 (1976)

(approving the exclusion of pregnancy, “a disease or disability
comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or
disabilities and yet confined to the members of one . . . sex”
from insurance coverage).
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not required by federal or state law.157
mischaracterized the issue.158

However, the majority

The issue was not one of

preferential treatment, but the inadequacy of leave provided for
pregnancy-related illness under the employer policy and the
disparate impact of that inadequacy upon pregnant employees.159
Pregnancy is a medical condition not only unique to women, but
unique from other medical conditions because pregnancy has a
definitive end. Therefore, policies such as Hilton’s
discriminate against pregnant employees using leave for
pregnancy-related illness by not only limiting the leave
available to medical conditions unrelated to pregnancy, but,

157

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1242 (proffering that it is the

legislator’s duty to decide if employers should be required to
provide “enhanced leave to cover the panoply of medical needs
that may arise during pregnancy”).
158

See id. at 1246 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the

majority completely misinterpreted the LAD and the broad
remedial powers granted the court under the legislation).
159

See id. (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the leave

policy would only be preferential if both men and women could
become pregnant and women then asked to be treated differently).
57

more importantly, limiting the leave available to childbirth.160
Leave legislation would not limit a non-pregnant employee in
such a way, especially if such limitations created a gap in
coverage.

Therefore both the LAD and the PDA prohibit this type

of treatment.161
Last, courts rejecting disparate impact theory claims
ignore precedent requiring that employers comprehensively meet
the needs of pregnant employees.162

160

Several cases set a clear

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting)

(interpreting the LAD broadly as prohibiting all discrimination
and granting the judiciary remedial power to end such
discrimination without usurping the legislature).
161

See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)

(stating clearly that pregnant employees should be treated the
same as “other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work” with regards to benefits and
leave).
162

See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall:

Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on
the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77, 131 (2003) (suggesting that
plaintiffs desiring to prove a disparate impact anticipate the
usual objections to the use of statistical evidence and perhaps
use demographic data that shows the impact on women in general).
58

precedent regarding the use of disparate impact theory in
pregnancy discrimination cases.163

Even when, as in Gerety, the

employers complied with the legislation in place at the time,
other courts have still found a disparate impact on pregnant
employees.164

163

See Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867

F.2d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding explicitly that PDA
claims may be brought under a disparate impact theory); see also
Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (applying disparate impact theory to pregnancy
discrimination cases and anticipating further application as the
PDA progressed); EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (permitting the use of disparate impact theory
with statistical evidence in a pregnancy discrimination case).
164

See Scherr, 867 F.2d at 978 (finding the school’s policy of

disallowing a combination of leave could be challenged under
disparate impact, even though the policy was legal under federal
and state leave legislation); see also Abraham, 660 F.2d at 813
(finding that the company’s policy of allowing only ten days of
leave had a disparate impact on pregnant employees, even though
the policy did not violate federal and state leave legislation);

Warshawsky, 768 F. Supp. at 654 (finding that the employer’s
policy of firing first-year employees who required long-term
59

Of course, employer’s policies are very diverse and the
response differs from court to court.165

However, as the Gerety

dissent argues, the presence of a leave gap is reflective of a
bigger issue of insufficient leave.166

In Abraham v. Graphic

Arts Int’l Union, the court clearly stated that “[a]n employer
can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an adequate
leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does

sick leave had a discriminatory impact, even though the policy
did not violate federal and state leave legislation).
165

See Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the

Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 325, 365 (1984-5) (suggesting that the reason for the
lack of precedent applying disparate impact theory to pregnancy
discrimination cases is because in earlier years overt
discrimination predominated, necessitating the application of
disparate treatment theory and only later in the 1970’s did it
become apparent that neutral rules could also be
discriminatory).
166

See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 866 A.2d

1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing this
lack of sufficient leave has a clear impact on pregnant
employees).
60

have.”167

Unfortunately, the majority in Gerety mirrored other

courts’ views that employer policies that comply with more
generous federal and state leave policies are not
discriminatory.168

One can assume a pregnant employee would be

rejected if filing suit against an employer policy that was in
legal compliance with a state law, such as California’s, which
offers several months of leave. However, such a preference by
the court would be erroneous because the generosity of the
legislation alone does not change the fact that legislation can
create a gap, which has a disparate impact upon only pregnant
employees.
A plaintiff has several strategies available to her whether

167

See Abraham, 660 F.2d at 819 (finding that despite the fact

that pregnant employees had access to the same ten-day leave
policy as male employees, it was “beyond peradventure” that the
leave policy was too short for adequate pregnancy or childbirth
leave).
168

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (emphasizing that the employer

already provided an amount of leave “more than the twice as much
as required by law”); see also Davidson v. Franciscan Health
Sys. of the Ohio Valley, Inc., 82 F.2d 768, 772 (2000) (finding
that a hospital’s policy of fourteen weeks of leave in addition
to the twelve weeks provided by FMLA did not violate the PDA).
61

she is pleading in a no-leave state or a generous leave state,
such as California.169

In order to make a case for disparate

impact, pregnant employees can employ social statistics to give
judicial notice of general discrimination, instead of being
forced to rely only on instances of impact at that specific
employer.170

This type of proof is particularly important in the

case of leave gaps because they disproportionately affect highrisk pregnancies and an employee might have a difficult time
showing multiple instances of affected high-risk pregnancies at
one employer, since they are relatively rare.171

169

However,

See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that plaintiffs

should use new demographic data on motherhood to establish “how
objective work requirements, like mandatory overtime, have a
disparate impact on women and mothers in the workforce . . . ”).
170

See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (stating:

“There is no requirement, however, that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the
characteristics of actual applicants.”).
171

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (stating that the employee

suffered bona fide medical conditions due to being pregnant with
twins); see also Davidson, 82 F.2d at 768 (stating that the
employee suffered from bona fide medical conditions due to being
pregnant with triplets).
62

employers can always defend themselves with claims of business
necessity, especially in the face of extensive leave
requirements.172

In response, several legal scholars argue that

to combat this defense, employees should rely on increasing
evidence of employers adopting generous leave policies and the
positive business impact of such policies.173

This type of

evidence not only combats the business necessity defense but
also goes to establishing a less discriminatory alternative.174
C.

Implications and Recommendations
1.

172

Leave Benefits Not Only the Employee and Employer
but Society in General and Should Be Legally
Mandated

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)

(resolving that a discriminatory employer policy cannot be
sustained unless it can be shown to relate to job performance).
173

See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that plaintiffs

should also use recent demographic data that demonstrates
objective work requirements discriminatorily effect women). For
instance, policies that require mandatory overtime or offer
reduced benefits to part-time employees have a disparate impact
on women, particularly women with children.
174

Id.

See id. (establishing that family friendly policies are not

only less discriminatory but also improve productively and
reduce rates of absenteeism, turnover, recruitment).
63

Women do not experience pregnancy in clearly definable
categories.

Pregnancy is seen as a holistic experience covering

all aspects of a person’s life, including physical,
psychological, economical, and emotional, and the law should
treat it as such.

Our country simply does not provide the

comprehensive leave pregnant employees need to meet their own
and their growing family’s needs, despite increasing evidence
that expanded leave would be best for both the employer and
employee.175
As previously stated, comprehensive leave for pregnant
employees can prevent the formation of other medical
conditions.176

In addition, adequate leave can result in better

prenatal and postnatal care, which is good not only for the

175

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 7 (noting that despite

political rhetoric, the U.S. is ranked virtually last among
industrialized nation with regards to parental leave).
176

See Shellenbarger, supra note 19 (reporting that fifty to

seventy percent of women experience post-partum anxiety, which
can be exacerbated by the stress of returning to work too soon).
64

mother and child, but society in general.177

More importantly,

adequate leave upon the birth of the child can result in a bevy
of benefits for the parents and child including: improved brain
development, social development, and overall well-being of the
baby.178

Adequate leave policies also have positive results for

society by increasing the likelihood that children will be
immunized and, as a result, are decreasing childhood mortality
rates.179
Comprehensive leave not only benefits employees, and
therefore, society in general, but also results in benefits to

177

See GRANT

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that parents are

already attuned to the benefits of leave and want better
legislation).
178

See id. (arguing far too many parents are robbed of these

benefits by citing a survey that found four out of five parents
with children believe that many new mothers are pressured to
return to work too quickly).
179

See id. (arguing that better parental leave policies would

help other societal problems, such as the lack of quality child
care).
65

employers.180 Several studies have shown that access to leave is
directly tied to employee retention and increased
productivity.181

While the FMLA does not provide enough leave to

meet the needs of working parents, that small increase alone has
already had a positive impact on profitability and growth of
leave.182
2.

Recommendations

The number of working women reporting instances of
pregnancy discrimination continues to rise, even as the birth
rate declines.183

180

As a result, pregnant women are taking less

See id. at 11 (stating that an increase in the leave

available to employees, be it paid or unpaid, is beneficial to
employers).
181

See Katherine Ross Phillips, Getting Time Off:

Access to

Leave Among Working Parents (The Urban Institute 2004) (showing
also that morale improves and employees show more loyalty toward
the company).
182

See id. (stating that in 2000, ninety percent of covered

establishments reported that the FMLA had either a positive or
neutral effect on profitability and growth).
183

See Rob Schumaucher, Pregnant Workers Report Growing

Discrimination, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.usatoday
.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm?
66

time off and working even up until their last month of
pregnancy.184

This is an important issue that states need to

address and the first step is adopting reasonable accommodation
standards for medical and parental leave.185

In doing so, states

would treat pregnancy comprehensively instead of drawing
confusing lines that create potential gaps in coverage.
The federal government should include a reasonable
accommodation standard within the PDA that applies to all

POE=click-refer (reporting that pregnancy discrimination
complaints to the EEOC jumped thirty-nine percent between 1999
and 2003, even though the birth rate dropped nine percent).
184

See Sharon Jayson, New Moms Taking Less Time Off With Babies,

USATODAY.COM, Nov. 13, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2005-11-13-mombabytime_x.htm?POE=click-refer (reporting that
about fifty-seven percent of new moms worked full time while
pregnant in 1996-2000 as opposed to about forty percent in 196165). In addition, over half of pregnant employees worked into
the last month of pregnancy.
185

Id.

See Millsap, supra note 132, at 1450 (arguing that the

federal government should also adopt a reasonable accommodations
standard under the PDA).
67

pregnancy-related conditions, including childbirth.186

The

physiological needs of pregnant women have a definitive end, and
therefore, could be safely dealt with under the reasonable
accommodation standard.

However, the federal government should

adopt a completely separate system of parental leave that begins
several weeks after childbirth and could have finite amounts of
coverage, since bonding time is an amorphous concept, but still
essential to American families.187
IV.

CONCLUSION
The separation of pregnancy into the three distinct periods

of absence due to illness related to gestation, childbirth, and
parental creates potential gaps in coverage that can leave
pregnant employees without leave and without job protection.188

186

See id. (arguing that the adoption of a reasonable

accommodation standard within the PDA would prevent inconsistent
results among states and employers).
187

See, e.g., California Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §

12945.2(c)(3)(A) (2005) (providing twelve weeks of leave for the
birth of a child or for a serious medical conditions, excluding
pregnancy-related conditions).
188

See, e.g., Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877

A.2d 1233, 1236 (N.J. 2005) (stating that the plaintiff was
68

While legislators have gone a long way in responding to the
needs of pregnant employees, their piecemeal efforts have
resulted in gaps between medical and parental leave provided at
both the state and federal level. Only a reasonable
accommodation standard can solve this problem by refusing to set
strict leave limits on pregnant employees and thus adequately
providing for their needs.189

However, where such legislation is

not available, employees who are faced with such a gap in
coverage should still be able to go to the court under disparate
impact theory and ask for remedy.190

fired during thirteen day gap in coverage between federally
provided medical leave and state provided parental leave).
189

See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting)

(arguing that plaintiff should be reasonably accommodated during
her pregnancy and that this is not preferential treatment,
because of the unique reproductive position of women).
190

See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that disparate

impact theory is a viable and successful option for
discrimination litigation, if pursued in the correct manner).
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